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The Congressional Research Service Report on Article V

This document explains what the Congressional Research Service report says about Article V and the actual significance it plays in the Article V process.

Attachment: 75/CRS-Response.pdf

 





 

 

Congressional Research Service Reports to 

Congress on Article V 

Since 2012, the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) has issued two 

reports for Congress on Article V of the Constitution.  One of them explains the 
history of Article V, the Founding Fathers’ motivations for including its two 
separate mechanisms for proposing constitutional amendments, and the procedures 
governing states’ applications for an Article V Convention.

1

  The other discusses the 

emergence of renewed interest in invoking Article V’s Convention mechanism and 
the questions that are sometimes raised regarding the logistics and procedures for 
such a Convention.

2

   

While both documents contain a wealth of historical data and a survey of 

scholarly opinions regarding Article V, it is important to bear in mind that they are, 
in fact, merely a collection of data and scholarship rather than a source of definitive 
answers to the questions presented.  The CRS does not advocate any particular 
position on the use of Article V to call for a Convention to propose amendments. 

 

The reports acknowledge a number of well-established facts about the 

operation of Article V’s Convention mechanism, including: 



 

Congress is obligated to call a Convention for proposing amendments if 34 
states apply; 



 

The Founders included this process as a way for the states to bypass 
Congress in getting needed amendments passed; 



 

The process is an alternative to federal deadlock; 

                                                           

1

 Thomas J. Neale, CRS Report R42592, 

The Article V Convention for Proposing Constitutional 

Amendments:  Historical perspectives for Congress

 (Oct. 22, 2012). 

2

 Thomas J. Neale, CRS Report R42589, 

The Article V Convention to Propose Constitutional 

Amendments:  Contemporary Issues for Congress

 (March 7, 2014). 





Response to CRS Reports on Article V 
Page 2 

 



 

Congress has no authority to “veto” amendments proposed at an Article V 
Convention; and 



 

The President plays no role in the process. 

The CRS also acknowledges that under the plain text of Article V, Congress’ 

authority over the amendment process is limited to (1) proposing amendments of its 
own, (2) summoning a Convention, and (3) submitting Convention-proposed 
amendments to the states for ratification.

3

  However, the author of these documents 

reports that Congress has “laid claim to” a number of other prerogatives as well, 
including tracking state applications, establishing procedures to summon a 
Convention, setting the timeframe for deliberations, determining the number of 
delegates and selection process for them, setting convention procedures, and 
arranging for transmission of the proposed amendments to the states.

4

 

While most of these functions are merely components of Congress’ explicit, 

ministerial duties under Article V, at least two of them—determining the number 
and selection method of delegates and establishing Convention rules—are 

not

 

proper functions of Congress under Article V.  Any attempt by Congress to assert 
such authority would raise significant constitutional concerns.   

As Article V expert, author, and constitutional historian Robert Natelson 

explains, “[T]he Article V Convention is a creature *** of the state legislatures, not 
of Congress, nor of the people directly.  Those legislatures, therefore, determine how 
delegates are allocated and selected.”

5

  Natelson explains how this conclusion 

follows from historical convention practice and points out that any scheme by which 
Congress prescribes delegate selection procedures would undercut the Founders’ 
very purpose for including the Convention mechanism in Article V:  to bypass 
Congress in achieving needed constitutional amendments.

6

 

The power to adopt rules for its proceedings is vested in the Convention itself, 

according to Founding-Era custom and historical precedent.

7

  It is not a matter over 

                                                           

3

 Report R42589, 

supra

, p. 4. 

4

 

Id. 

5

 Robert G. Natelson, “Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention:  Rules Governing the 

Convention Process,” 78 T

ENN

.

 

L.

 

R

EV

.

 

693, 740 (2011). 

6

 

Id. 

7

 

Id

.

 

(

citing Dyer v. Blair

, 390 F.Supp. 1291, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (“Article V identifies the body—

either a legislature or a convention—which must ratify a proposed amendment.  The act of 
ratification is an expression of consent to the amendment by that body.  By what means that body 
shall decide to consent or not to consent is a matter for that body to determine for itself.”).  While 

Dyer 

addresses ratifying conventions, the same rule applies to a proposing convention. 





Response to CRS Reports on Article V 
Page 3 

 

which Congress exercises discretion.

8

  The rules set by the Convention include the 

rule of suffrage, but the initial rule is “one state, one vote.”

9

 

So these two powers—the power to regulate delegate selection and 

apportionment and to adopt Convention rules—are 

not 

within the purview of 

Congress.  And in fact, the CRS Report’s assertion that Congress has “laid claim to” 
these prerogatives appears to be merely a recognition of the fact that certain 
Members of Congress have, at various times in the past, introduced legislation 
purporting to address these matters.  Each of these efforts has failed, and none has 
been attempted since 1991. 

 

                                                           

8

 

Id.  See also 

Russell L. Caplan, C

ONSTITUTIONAL 

B

RINKMANSHIP

:

  

A

MENDING THE 

C

ONSTITUTION BY 

N

ATIONAL 

C

ONVENTION

,

 

119-20 (1988). 

9

 

Id.

, at 741.

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