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Article V Apologetics Handbook
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 ____________________________________________________________________ When people make truth claims, it’s not your job to refute them—it is their job to support them. So before responding to their statements, ask questions. - Frank Turek ____________________________________________________________________  1 Overview  2 Article V Apologetics E ff ectively Engaging JBS-influenced Legislators The Problem: Organizations like the John Birch Society and the Eagle Forum have been spreading false and erroneous information in opposition to Convention of States. Unfortunately, they have been successful in swaying legislators largely based upon fear. We need a new approach that exposes the weakness and illogical nature of their arguments. Apologetics: This term originates from the Greek word “apologia,” which means to make a defense. In its most basic sense, apologetics involves offering an organized alternative view of a topic, not necessarily in a quarrelsome manner. It often focuses on responding to an opponent’s assertions with questions designed to expose errors in their thinking. In many cases, the questions will cause the opponent to actually think about their assertions for the first time, rather than just continuing to recite jargon that they have accepted as a substitute for thinking. ____________________________________________________________________ When people make truth claims, it’s not your job to refute them—it is their job to support them. So before responding to their statements, ask questions. - Frank Turek ____________________________________________________________________ Article V Apologetics aims to create grassroots advocates who are skilled at engaging with opponents and legislators, relying on apologetic techniques. The primary tools for Article V Apologetics are questions designed to require those we engage with to rethink their position. However, before a grassroots advocate can e ff ectively engage through questions, they must have an in-depth base of knowledge. They must also have the discipline to use their in-depth knowledge to guide the questions they ask rather than execute a knowledge dump on the person with whom they are engaging. The goal is to get the other person to think. A knowledge dump will shut down their thinking.  3 Engaging Legislators who have been exposed to JBS talking points is the primary focus of the Article V Apologetics approach, although this approach can also be e ff ective in engaging non-legislator JBS opponents. The key to success with the apologetic method is knowledge and practice. The first step is to learn the information in the resources below: • Article V Apologetics Questions • Article V Apologetics Toolkit o The 1787 Convention Call and Commissions o 42 Historical interstate conventions o Response to the Recommendation of the 1787 Convention o Amendments to the U.S. Constitution o Similarities Between the Articles of Confederation and the U.S. Constitution o Proposed Amendments to the Articles of Confederation o Selected Court Cases Related to Article V o State Provisions o Legislative Term Limits • Article V Apologetics Study Material o Elevator Speech o The Levers of Influence o Facts from Mike Farris Article o Conventional Wisdom by Michael Farris o Federalist #40 o Federalist #43 (excerpt) o Federalist #85 o Findings of Court Cases Related to Article V of the United States Constitution The second step is to practice leading with questions to introduce the material that refutes the JBS talking points. This can include using the reference material in the Toolkit as discussion material. Practice is done by role-playing with someone who assumes the role of the legislator. This can also be role played with someone assuming the role of a JBS non-legislator opponent. This process is best understood through experience rather than explanation. Learning the process through role playing is critical. Contact Legislative Associate, Paul Phillips at pphillips@cosaction.com < >to schedule your team for an Article V Apologetics workshop .  4 Levers of Influence  5 Liking : People prefer to say yes to individuals they like. • Physical Attractiveness • Similarity • Compliments Reciprocation : A person feels obligated to repay what another person has provided. • Give something first • Make an initial concession • Rejection then retreat Social Proof : People decide what to do or believe based on what others do or believe. • Uncertainty • The many • Future social proof Authority : People rely on authority figures when making decisions. • Titles • Clothing • Trappings • In Authority vs An Authority Scarcity : People assign more value to opportunities that are less available. • Loss aversion • Less accessibility = more value Commitment and Consistency : People want their actions to be consistent with their words. • Personal consistency is valued • Get verbal commitment, then ask for a consistent action Unity : People say yes to someone they consider one of them. • Members of groups favor the welfare of fellow members over non-members • People are influenced by the preferences and actions of fellow members • Loyalty over ideology From Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert P Cialdini, Ph. D.  6 Elevator Speech Convention of States is a non-partisan, nonprofit, grassroots organization working to amend the US Constitution in ways that Congress never would. We are advocating for amendments that would provide term limits for Congress, the Judiciary, and Executive Branch bureaucrats. Wouldn’t you agree that this is a problem we’ve seen with both Democrats and Republicans in oRice for too long? We would also like to place fiscal restraints on the federal government, such as requiring a balanced budget, because of the out-of-control spending. Wouldn’t you agree that we see out-of-control spending from both Democrat and Republican-controlled Congresses? Finally, we want to reduce the power of the federal government. An example would be requiring each bill to be limited to a single subject, as is required in most state legislatures. Wouldn’t it be nice to have no more 1,000-page bills that nobody has read before it comes up for a vote? The Constitution gives us a solution in Article V. It says that if we can get 2/3 of the states, that’s 34 states, to ask for a meeting of the states to discuss and propose amendments, just like Congress does, we can hold that meeting. Congress would not be able to override or control the meeting. Any proposed amendments that emerge from this meeting will go back to the states, just like amendments proposed by Congress. Three-fourths, or 38 states, would have to agree to each proposed amendment for it to become part of the constitution. We already have 19 of the required 34 states on board. [Legislator Ask] Would you be willing to support our eRort by co-sponsoring the Convention of States Application? [General Public Ask] Today, we are collecting signatures on our petition. If you sign the petition, we will email your state legislators to tell them you support the goals of Convention of States. Would you be interested in signing the petition?  7 State Provisions Term Limits on Legislators (16) Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota Term Limits on Supreme Court Justices (47) Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming Balanced Budget (49) Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming Single Subject Bills (45) Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas*, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi*, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming *Appropriation bills only.  8 Legislative Term Limits Median tenure of Federal Legislators: 8 years Median tenure of State legislators without term limits: 8 years Median tenure of State legislators with term limits: 4 years Here is a list of the top 25 longest-serving current members of the US Congress as of July 14, 2025, based on total Bme served (cumulaBve across both chambers, where applicable). All have conBnuous service without breaks. Tenure is calculated as completed years plus addiBonal days since the last service anniversary. 1. Chuck Grassley (R-IA, Senate): 50 years, 192 days 2. Ed Markey (D-MA, Senate): 48 years, 254 days 3. Hal Rogers (R-KY, House): 44 years, 192 days 4. Christopher Smith (R-NJ, House): 44 years, 192 days 5. Ron Wyden (D-OR, Senate): 44 years, 192 days 6. Chuck Schumer (D-NY, Senate): 44 years, 192 days 7. Steny Hoyer (D-MD, House): 44 years, 56 days 8. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH, House): 42 years, 192 days 9. Dick Durbin (D-IL, Senate): 42 years, 192 days 10. Mitch McConnell (R-KY, Senate): 40 years, 192 days 11. Ben Cardin (D-MD, Senate): 38 years, 192 days 12. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA, House): 38 years, 42 days 13. Frank Pallone (D-NJ, House): 36 years, 248 days 14. Richard Neal (D-MA, House): 36 years, 192 days 15. Maxine Waters (D-CA, House): 34 years, 192 days 16. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT, House): 34 years, 192 days 17. Jack Reed (D-RI, Senate): 34 years, 192 days 18. Bernie Sanders (I-VT, Senate): 34 years, 192 days 19. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY, House): 32 years, 253 days 20. Jim Clyburn (D-SC, House): 32 years, 192 days 21. Sanford Bishop (D-GA, House): 32 years, 192 days 22. Ken Calvert (R-CA, House): 32 years, 192 days 23. Bobby Scoa (D-VA, House): 32 years, 192 days 24. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY, House): 32 years, 192 days 25. Paay Murray (D-WA, Senate): 32 years, 192 days Created with Grok  9 Questions  10 Article V Apologetics Questions Runaway Convention 1. What do you mean by “runaway”? 2. By claiming that an Article V Amending Convention will “runaway”, are you claiming that: a. At the convention, a commissioner will propose throwing out the current U.S. Constitution and drafting a new one or repealing something like the First Amendment. Is that correct? b. and the remaining commissioners will not object, or if someone does object, at least 26 of the delegations will vote to proceed. Is that correct? c. and all 50 State Legislatures will sit idly by and watch this play out … d. and while the Amending Convention is broadcast live, hundreds of millions of Americans will also sit idly by. Is that correct? e. and then, when the proposal comes up for a vote, 26 of the state delegations will vote in favor of it, despite the members of at least 34 of the state delegations having taken an oath and being instructed not to vote for such a provision, most of them under penalty of a felony for doing so. Is that correct? f. and then none of the state legislatures will act to void the vote of their delegations and will not prosecute any of their commissioners for violating their oaths and instructions. Is that correct? g. and then the proposal is ratified by 38 states. Is that correct? 3. If you were a state legislator and you saw this playing out, what would you do? 4. What would your constituents do? 5. What do you believe are the odds of your state ratifying? 6. What do you think the odds of 38 states ratifying? 7. If we assume there is a 50% chance of each state ratifying, this is the same as tossing a coin 50 times and getting at least 38 heads. The probability of at least 38 of the 50 conventions voting to ratify is 0.014%. Is that something to be concerned about? 8. Of the 42 known interstate conventions, are there any other than the 1787 convention that are claimed to be a “runaway”? The 1787 Constitutional Convention was a Runaway 1. What do you mean by “runaway”? 2. How did you come to this conclusion? Do you believe that the 1787 convention was a runaway because of your personal research into primary sources and peer reviewed research, or is this something you heard from some other source? If so, what is the source?  11 3. Since you believe that the Constitution was illegally adopted, are you claiming that the Articles of Confederation should still govern us? 4. Since you believe that the Constitution was illegally adopted, do you believe that the founders lacked character and integrity, and as a result were untrustworthy? 5. What do you believe are the instructions given to the convention? a. What was the call? b. What were the commissions? c. Who issued the call? 6. The resolution passed by the Confederation Congress states, “Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient…” Does that language convey any legal authority? 7. If the resolution passed by the Confederation Congress is the call, why is it expressed as an opinion? a. Why was it not addressed to the states? b. Why was it not sent to the states? 8. Can you show me in the Articles of Confederation where the Confederation Congress was granted the power to call a convention? 9. How could the resolution passed by the Confederation Congress be the call if six states chose and instructed their commissioners before the resolution was passed? 10. Which state was the first to pass a resolution selecting and instructing its commissioners to the convention? Why isn’t this the call? 11. What would be the minimum portion of the Articles of Confederation that must remain so as not to violate an instruction to only revise the Articles of Confederation? a. Would the convention be able to change the title? b. Would the convention be able to change the format? c. Would the convention be able to add provisions? d. Would the convention be able to delete provisions? 12. If the 1787 Convention exceeded its authority, why did the Confederation Congress approve the new constitution, and the states initiate ratifying conventions? a. Why was a resolution in the New York Senate claiming the New York delegation exceeded its instruction to amend the Articles of Confederation defeated? b. Why was a resolution at the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention claiming the Massachusetts delegation exceeded its instruction to amend the Articles of Confederation defeated? 9. If the states that sent delegates to the 1787 convention all accepted the proposed constitution as legitimate and quickly acted to ratify it, using the procedure recommended by the convention, who are we to today accuse the convention of acting beyond its authority?  12 10. If the ConfederaBon Congress had not passed its resoluBon, what would be the call? 11. If the ConfederaBon Congress had not passed its resoluBon, would the 1787 convenBon sBll happen? 12. If only the ConfederaBon Congress resoluBon had passed and no state resoluBons were passed, would the states sBll have to meet in convenBon? The Ratification Process was Changed 1. Why do you think the 1787 convention would propose changing the ratification process? 2. How many amendments to the Articles of Confederation were proposed? How many were ratified? 3. Do you think the Constitution would have been ratified if the approval of all thirteen states was required? 4. The commissions and the Confederation Congress resolution contained a phrase of this form: “…reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states…” a. Which part of the phrase applies to the convention? b. Which part of this phrase applies to the states? c. Could the 1787 Convention impose a new ratification procedure or just propose one? The 1787 Convention was Conducted in Secret 1. The deliberations at the 1787 Convention were kept secret, but what happened with the proposed constitution after it was submitted to the Confederation Congress? a. Wasn’t it shared with the Confederation Congress and the States? b. Wasn’t it debated in ratifying conventions in each state? c. Wasn’t it the topic of widely published opinion pieces (the Federalist Papers and the Anti-Federalist Papers)? 2. Are you aware that the Articles of Confederation were developed by the Continental Congress in strict secrecy from July 12, 1776, until November 15, 1777, at which time it was presented to the states? 3. Do you believe an Article V Amending Convention could be held in secret today?  13 Nullification 1. Can you give me an example of when nullification has been used successfully? The only examples I can think of are sanctuary cities and marijuana legalization. 2. How do we nullify the federal debt? 3. How do we nullify Supreme Court misinterpretation of the Constitution? The Government Does Not Follow the Constitution 1. Which parts of the Constitution do they not follow? 2. Do we still prohibit slavery? 3. Can women still vote? 4. Do presidents still serve no more than two terms? 5. Can you name an amendment that congress is not following? Congress Controls the Convention Because They Call It 1. Who do you believe called the 1787 convention? 2. Who selected the delegates for that convention? 3. Who decided on the rules for that convention? 4. Who determined how many delegates to send from each state? 5. Does it seem like the body who called the convention controls it? The Subject of a Convention cannot be Limited 1. According to the Article V Library, there have been over 400 applications for an Article V convention for proposing amendments. If it only takes 34 states to apply for an Article V convention for proposing amendments, why have we never had one? Article V is Only for Fixing Errors 1. If you believe that the 16th and 17th amendments were bad amendments that were ratified, how do we eliminate them? 2. Are there any errors in the current version of the constitution that could be fixed through an Article V Amending Convention?  14 Con-Con 1. What do you mean by a “Con-Con?” 2. Can there be di ff erent types of a Constitutional Convention? a. Constitutional Drafting Convention? b. Constitutional Amending Convention? 3. Do you believe Article V authorizes a Constitutional Drafting Convention? 4. What did the drafters mean by “convention for proposing amendments”? 5. Shouldn’t you be more precise when you use the term “Con-Con” to avoid confusing a drafting convention with an amending convention? Not Enough Detail in Article V 1. What do you think the founders meant by “a convention for proposing amendments?” 2. What kind of experience did the drafters of the U.S. Constitution have with Conventions of the States? 3. How did the states know how to select and instruct their delegations to the 1787 convention? 4. How did the delegates know how to operate a convention? 5. Since the founders were in a convention of the states while drafting Article V, do you think they knew what they meant by the term “convention?” 6. In the Constitution, what is meant by “due process of law?” 7. Imagine you were out running errands, and your spouse sent you a text that said, “Get Milk.” What kind of milk would you get? How much milk would you get? How did you know the type and amount of milk to get? 8. Are you aware of any precedent in court rulings regarding the convention process? We Just Need to Follow the Constitution as Written 1. Agreed. Would you support this proposed amendment? a. The meaning of each part of this Constitution shall remain fixed at the time of its ratification, until properly changed by amendment. 2. Wouldn’t following the constitution include using Article V, as it is part of the constitution?  15 The Constitution is not the Problem 1. What is the purpose of the Constitution? 2. I like law professor Randy Barnett’s claim that “The Constitution governs those who govern us.” It is a tool for restraining the Federal Government. If there is a nail that has worked its way out of a board, I am going to whack it back into place by using a hammer. I am not going to think “I cannot use a hammer because the hammer is not the problem.” JBS/Eagle Forum/FOAC/NAGR 1. How can these organizations claim reverence for the U.S. Constitution when they claim it is an illegally adopted document? 2. Do they believe we should still be governed by the Articles of Confederation? 3. How can they claim that we do not have statesmen today of the same character and honor as our founders when they claim our founders dishonorably ignored the instructions provided to the 1787 Convention and illegally changed the ratification method? 4. How can they revere our founders while accusing them of such dishonorable acts?  16 Toolkit  17 The 1787 Constitutional Convention Call and Commissions Date State Commission 11/23/1786 Virginia devising and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union. [meet Second Monday in May 1787 in Philadelphia] 11/24/1786 New Jersey for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and other important objects, and of devising such further provisions as shall appear necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies thereof 12/3/1786 Pennsylvania devising, deliberating on, and discussing all such alterations and further provisions as may be necessary to render the foederal constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union 1/6/1787 North Carolina To discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the defects of our foederal union, and to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to effect. 2/3/1787 Delaware devising, deliberating on, and discussing, such Alterations and further Provisions, as may be necessary to render the Foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union [each State shall have one vote] 2/10/1787 Georgia Devising and discussing all such alterations and farther provisions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of the union. 2/21/1787 Confederation Congress Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union. 3/6/1787 New York the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union. 3/7/1787 Massachusetts amend the Articles of Confederation to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the union. 3/8/1787 South Carolina in devising and discussing all such alterations, clauses, articles and provisions as may be thought necessary to render the foederal constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation and future good government of the confederated states 5/17/1787 Connecticut Such Alterations and Provisions, agreeable to the general Principles of Republican Government, as they shall think proper, to render the foederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of Government, and the Preservation of the Union. 5/26/1787 Maryland considering such alterations, and further provisions, as may be necessary to render the federal constitution adequate for the exigencies of the union. 6/27/1787 New Hampshire to discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remedy the defects of our federal union. https:%%//%%conventionofstates.com/files/defying-conventional-wisdom-the-constitution-was-not-the-product-of-a-runaway-convention-by- michael-farris-1  18 42 Historical Interstate Conventions Year Location Purpose Voting Runaway 1677 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1684 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1689 Boston Defense issues 1 State 1 Vote No 1689 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1690 New York City Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1693 New York City Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1694 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1704 New York City Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1711 Boston Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1722 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1744 Albany Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1744 Lancaster Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1745 Albany Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1745 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1747 New York City Defense 1 State 1 Vote No 1751 Albany Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1754 Albany Indian negotiations and plan of union 1 State 1 Vote No 1765 New York City Response to Stamp Act 1 State 1 Vote No 1768 Fort Stanwyx Indian negotiations 1 State 1 Vote No 1774 New York City Response to British actions 1 State 1 Vote No 1776-77 Providence, RI Paper currency and public credit 1 State 1 Vote No 1777 Yorktown, PA Price control 1 State 1 Vote No 1777 Springfield, MA Economic issues 1 State 1 Vote No 1778 New Haven, CT Price controls and other responses to inflation 1 State 1 Vote No 1779 Hartford, CT Economic issues 1 State 1 Vote No 1780 Philadelphia, PA Price controls 1 State 1 Vote No 1780 Boston, MA Conduct of Revolutionary War 1 State 1 Vote No 1780 Hartford, CT Conduct of Revolutionary War 1 State 1 Vote No 1781 Providence, RI War supply 1 State 1 Vote No 1786 Annapolis, MD Trade 1 State 1 Vote No 1787 Philadelphia, PA Propose changes to political system 1 State 1 Vote No 1814 Hartford, CT New England states response to the war of 1812 1 State 1 Vote No 1850 Nashville, TN Southern response to the North 1 State 1 Vote No 1861 Washington, DC Propose a constitutional amendment 1 State 1 Vote No 1861 Montgomery, AL Write the Confederate Constitution 1 State 1 Vote No 1889 St. Louis, MO Propose anti-trust measures 1 State 1 Vote No 1922 Santa Fe, NM Negotiate the Colorado River Compact 1 State 1 Vote No 1928-29 Santa Fe, NM Negotiate temporary Rio Grande Compact 1 State 1 Vote No 1928-38 Colorado Springs, CO Santa Fe, NM Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 1 State 1 Vote No 1937 Santa Fe, NM Negotiate the Rio Grande Compact 1 State 1 Vote No 1946-49 Denver, CO Negotiate the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact 1 State 1 Vote No 2017 Phoenix, AZ Propose rules for an Article V convention to propose a balanced budget 1 State 1 Vote No https://articlevinfocenter.com/list-conventions-states-colonies-american-history/ https:%%//%%articlevinfocenter.com/no-a-convention-of-states-could-not-change-the-one-state-one- vote-rule/  19 Response to the Recommendation of the 1787 Convention State Initiated Ratifying Convention Ratified Confederation Congress n/a September 28, 1787 Delaware October 1787 December 7, 1787 Pennsylvania September 29, 1787 December 12, 1787 New Jersey November 1, 1787 December 18, 1787 Georgia October 17, 1787 January 1, 1788 Connecticut October 17, 1787 January 9, 1788 Massachusetts October 25, 1787 February 6, 1788 Maryland November 29,1787 April 28, 1788 North Carolina December 6, 1787 April 18, 1788 New Hampshire January 17, 1788 June 21, 1788 Virginia October 25, 1787 June 25, 1788 New York February 1, 1788 July 26, 1788 South Carolina January 8, 1788 August 2, 1788 Rhode Island Rhode Island did not call a convenBon, opBng instead for a town-by-town vote in 1788, which rejected the ConsBtuBon. A formal convenBon was eventually called on February 27, 1790. May 29, 1790 Created with Grok  20 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Amendment Year Summary I 1791 Guarantees freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly, and petition. II 1791 Protects the right to bear arms. III 1791 Prohibits quartering of soldiers in private homes without consent in peacetime. IV 1791 Protects against unreasonable searches and seizures; requires warrants. V 1791 Ensures due process, protects against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, and requires just compensation for eminent domain VI 1791 Guarantees rights to a speedy, public trial, impartial jury, counsel, and confrontation of witnesses in criminal cases. VII 1791 Preserves right to jury trial in civil cases over $20; limits re-examination of jury findings. VIII 1791 Prohibits excessive bail, fines, and cruel or unusual punishment. IX 1791 States that unlisted rights are not denied to the people. X 1791 Reserves powers not delegated to the federal government to the states or people. XI 1795 Limits federal court jurisdiction over suits against states by citizens of other states of foreign countries. XII 1804 Revises Electoral College process, requiring separate votes for President and Vice President. XIII 1865 Abolishes slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime. XIV 1868 Grants citizenship to all born or naturalized in the U.S., ensures due process and equal protection, and addresses post-Civil War issues. XV 1870 Prohibits denying the right to vote based on race, color, or previous servitude XVI 1913 Allows Congress to levy income tax without apportioning it among states. XVII 1913 Establishes direct election of U.S. Senators by popular vote. XVIII 1919 Prohibits the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors (Prohibition). XIX 1920 Grants women the right to vote. XX 1933 Sets terms and inauguration dates for Presidents and Congress, addresses succession. XXI 1933 Repeals the Eighteenth Amendment, ending Prohibition.  21 XXII 1951 Limits Presidents to two terms. XXIII 1961 Grants Washington, D.C., electors in presidential elections. XXIV 1964 Prohibits poll taxes in federal elections. XXV 1967 Establishes procedures for presidential succession and disability. XXVI 1971 Lowers the voting age to 18. XXVII 1992 Delays changes to congressional compensation until after an election. Created with Grok Unratified Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Amendment Date Summary Congressional Apportionment 1789 Limiting House seats to one per 50,000 people Titles of Nobility 1810 Would strip U.S. citizenship from anyone accepting a foreign title of nobility or foreign gifts without congressional consent. Corwin Amendment 1861 Prevent Congress from banning slavery in states where it existed, Child Labor 1924 Would grant Congress the power to regulate, limit, or prohibit the labor of persons under 18. Equal Rights (ERA) 1972 Would guarantee equal rights under the law regardless of sex. D.C. Voting Rights 1978 Would grant Washington, D.C., full congressional voting representation (two Senators and at least one Representative) and treat it as a state for amendment ratification purposes. Created with Grok  22 Selected Court Cases Related to Article V Case Holding Barker v. Hazeltine , 3 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D.S.D. 1998) Article V is the only constitutional method of amending the US Constitution. Dodge v. Woolsey , 59 U.S. 331 (1855) Amendatory conventions may be single issue. T he States and/or the people cannot dictate the amendments. A state application is valid solely because it was made by the state. Gralike v. Cooke , 191 F. 3d 911 (8 th Cir. 1999) Article V Conventions cannot be prohibited from deliberation and consideration of a proposed amendment and thereby limited to pre-written wording. Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) No signature of the President is required for a constitutional amendment to be valid and complete. In Re Opinion of the Justices, 204 N.C. 306, 172 S.E. 474 (1933) An Article V Convention may be limited in purpose to a single issue or to a fixed set of issues. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) The state legislature’s discretion could not be supplanted by the rules imposed by a third party. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate , 373 Mass. 877, 366 N.E. 2d 1226 (1977) The governor plays no role in the approval process of an Article V Convention application. Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania , 41 U.S. 539 (1842) No one is authorized to question the validity of a state’s application for an Article V Convention. Smith v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 30 U.S. 518 (1831) An Article V Convention is a “convention of the States” and is therefore endowed with the powers of an interstate convention. State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 320 (1920) An Article V Convention will require only two- thirds of the quorum present to conduct business. Ullmann v. United States , 350 U.S. 422 (1956) The amendment and ratification processes cannot be changed to circumvent the Article V Convention. United States v. Thibault, 47 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1931) The federal or national government is not concerned with how an Article V Convention of a state legislature is constituted. Therefore, the Article V Convention is empowered to organize and conduct its business as the delegates or commissioners see fit. https://rickbulow.com/Library/Books/Non-Fiction/ArticleV/FindingsOfCourtCasesRelatedToArticleVOfTheUnitedStatesConstitution.pdf  23 Proposed Amendments to the Articles of Confederation Date Proposal Purpose Outcome 1781 Grant Congress the power to levy a 5% duty on imports to fund war debts and national expenses. Address the Confederation's inability to raise revenue independently, as it relied on state contributions. Not approved . Initially proposed in 1781, it was supported by 12 states but blocked by Rhode Island in 1782. A revised version in 1783 also failed when New York withheld approval. 1783 Allow Congress to impose taxes and requisitions, with a 30- year limit, to secure funds for national debts. Strengthen federal fiscal authority to manage debts from the Revolutionary War. Not approved . Like the impost amendment, it required unanimous consent and was rejected by one or more states. 1784 Grant Congress authority to regulate foreign and interstate commerce for a limited period (15 years). Enable uniform trade policies and counter foreign trade restrictions, as states pursued conflicting commercial policies. Not approved . Opposed by states like Virginia, which feared federal overreach or loss of state control over trade. 1784 Authorize Congress to use military force to compel states to comply with federal requisitions. Address states’ failure to meet financial and military obligations, as Congress lacked enforcement power. Not approved . States were wary of granting Congress such coercive authority, fearing it would undermine state sovereignty. 1785 - 1786 Various suggestions emerged, including giving Congress power to regulate navigation, establish a federal judiciary, and create a permanent revenue system. A 1786 Annapolis Convention called for broader reforms, leading to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. Address systemic issues like economic instability, interstate disputes, and weak federal authority. Not approved . These proposals gained traction but were overtaken by the decision to draft a new Constitution rather than amend the Articles. Created with Grok  24 Similarities Between the Articles of Confederation and the U.S. Constitution The ArBcles of ConfederaBon (1781-1789) and the U.S. ConsBtuBon (1788-present) share foundaBonal elements as early frameworks for governing the United States, though the ConsBtuBon addressed many weaknesses of the ArBcles. Here are the key similariBes: • Sovereignty of States : Both documents recognized states as significant enBBes with authority. The ArBcles emphasized state sovereignty more strongly, but the ConsBtuBon retained state powers through federalism, balancing them with a stronger naBonal government. • Na0onal Government Structure : Both established a central government with a Congress to make laws. Under the ArBcles, Congress was unicameral, while the ConsBtuBon created a bicameral Congress (House and Senate), but both aimed to provide a legislaBve body for naBonal governance. • Powers of Congress : Both granted Congress authority over foreign affairs, war and peace, and treaBes. For example, both allowed Congress to declare war and manage relaBons with NaBve American tribes. • No Execu0ve or Judicial Branch in Original Design : The ArBcles lacked a separate execuBve or judiciary, relying on Congress for all funcBons. The ConsBtuBon introduced these branches, but both documents iniBally centralized most governance in the legislaBve body. • Amendment Process : Both required a high threshold for amendments. The ArBcles needed unanimous state approval, while the ConsBtuBon requires two- thirds of Congress and three-fourths of states, reflecBng a shared commitment to stability in governance. • Union of States : Both aimed to create a perpetual union. The ArBcles described a “firm league of friendship” among states, and the ConsBtuBon’s preamble emphasizes forming a “more perfect Union,” building on the same goal of unity. • Defense and General Welfare : Both prioriBzed collecBve defense and promoBng the general welfare. The ArBcles allowed Congress to requisiBon funds for common defense, and the ConsBtuBon explicitly grants Congress taxing power for defense and welfare. Created with Grok  25 Reference Material  26 Facts from Mike Farris Article 1. The commissioners to an interstate convention are controlled by: a. The Call: this is contained in the first state-passed resolution for the convention. It applies to all commissioners. b. The Commissions: each state passes a resolution with instruction that apply to the members of its delegation. c. There were 30 known interstate conventions prior to the 1787 convention which well established the process for an interstate convention, including the controlling e ff ect of the call and the commissions. 2. There have been 42 documented interstate conventions in our history, dated back to 1677. None of these have been a “runaway”, and all have been one- state one-vote. 3. Virginia issued the call for the 1787 convention on 11/23/1786: “…devising and discussing all such further provisions, as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the Union.” 4. Six states selected and instructed commissioners to the convention prior to the Confederation Congress passing a resolution. None of these required amending the Articles of Confederation. a. Virginia: 11/23/1786 b. New Jersey: 11/24/1786 c. Pennsylvania: 12/03/1786 d. North Carolina: 01/06/1787 e. Delaware: 02/03/1787 f. Georgia: 02/10/1787 5. The Confederation Congress issued its resolution on 02/21/1787. a. “Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION.” b. The Articles of Confederation did not grant the Confederation Congress the power to call an interstate convention. c. This is not directed to the states. It is just a statement of opinion. d. Congress did not forward this to the states.  27 6. New York and Massachusetts followed the language of the Confederation Congress to “revise the Articles of Confederation.” a. New York: 03/06/1787 b. Massachusetts: 03/17/1787 c. These instructions applied only to the commissioners of New York and Massachusetts. d. After the 1787 convention, the New York Senate took up a resolution claiming that the New York delegation had violated its commission by proposing a new constitution rather than revising the Articles of Confederation. The resolution was defeated. e. In the Massachusetts ratifying convention, a motion was considered that claimed that the Massachusetts delegation had violated its commission by proposing a new constitution rather than revising the Articles of Confederation. The resolution was defeated. 7. The remaining four states selected and instructed their commissioners without the requirement to only amend the Articles of Confederation. a. South Carolina: 03/08/1787 b. Connecticut: 05/17/1787 c. Maryland: 05/26/1787 d. New Hampshire: 06/27/1787  28 Federalist No. 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained From the New York Packet Friday, January 18, 1788. Author: James Madison To the People of the State of New York: THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act from Annapolis recommends the “appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same. ”The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following:“WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:“Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. ”From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of  29 expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes. There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in THE ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the  30 legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States 1 are actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The THIRD point to be  31 inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to ”abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," 2 since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in  32 mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation. PUBLIUS. 1. Connecticut and Rhode Island. 2. Declaration of Independence.  33 Federalist No. 40 The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained From the New York Packet Friday, January 18, 1788. Author: James Madison To the People of the State of New York: THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act from Annapolis recommends the “appointment of commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the United States; to devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same. ”The recommendatory act of Congress is in the words following:“WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects in the present Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States, and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:“Resolved, That in the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. ”From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish, in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of  34 expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes. There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in THE ARTICLES OF THE CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention? No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the body of the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the  35 legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States 1 are actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the government should act on the States, and not immediately on individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new government will act on the States in their collective characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted to the general government in such a form as would render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of the general government should be limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation. The THIRD point to be  36 inquired into is, how far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could have supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had been real and final powers for the establishment of a Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers, warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to ”abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness," 2 since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States were first united against the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient government; that committees and congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended for. They must have borne in  37 mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular, which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it shall be granted for a moment that the convention were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be, not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be GOOD. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers, except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that finally, if they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation. PUBLIUS. 1. Connecticut and Rhode Island. 2. Declaration of Independence.  38 Federalist No. 43 The Same Subject Continued: The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (excerpt) For the Independent Journal . Author: James Madison To the People of the State of New York: … 8. “To provide for amendments to be raBfied by three fourths of the States under two excepBons only. ”That useful alteraBons will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convenBon seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the ConsBtuBon too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The excepBon in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representaBon in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States parBcularly aaached to that equality. The other excepBon must have been admiaed on the same consideraBons which produced the privilege defended by it. 9. “The raBficaBon of the convenBons of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this ConsBtuBon between the States, raBfying the same. “This arBcle speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the ConsBtuBon. To have required the unanimous raBficaBon of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essenBal interests of the whole to the caprice or corrupBon of a single member. It  39 would have marked a want of foresight in the convenBon, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable. Two quesBons of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion: 1. On what principle the ConfederaBon, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parBes to it? 2. What relaBon is to subsist between the nine or more States raBfying the ConsBtuBon, and the remaining few who do not become parBes to it? The first quesBon is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservaBon; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all poliBcal insBtuBons aim, and to which all such insBtuBons must be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the ConfederaBon, that in many of the States it had received no higher sancBon than a mere legislaBve raBficaBon. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligaBon on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislaBve authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parBes. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaBes, that all the arBcles are mutually condiBons of each other; that a breach of any one arBcle is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, commiaed by either of the parBes, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a jusBficaBon for dispensing with the consent of parBcular States to a dissoluBon of the federal pact, will not the complaining parBes find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infracBons with which they may be confronted? The Bme has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same moBves dictate.  40 The second quesBon is not less delicate; and the flaaering prospect of its being merely hypotheBcal forbids an overcurious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be leq to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no poliBcal relaBon can subsist between the assenBng and dissenBng States, yet the moral relaBons will remain uncancelled. The claims of jusBce, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst consideraBons of a common interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anBcipaBon of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one side, and PRUDENCE on the other. PUBLIUS.  41 Federalist No. 85 Concluding Remarks From McLEAN'S EdiBon, New York. Author: Alexander Hamilton To the People of the State of New York: ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear sBll to remain for discussion two points: ”the analogy of the proposed government to your own State consBtuBon,” and “the addiBonal security which its adopBon will afford to republican government, to liberty, and to property.” But these heads have been so fully anBcipated and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the quesBon, and the Bme already spent upon it, conspire to forbid. It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convenBon to the act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the ExecuBve, the want of a council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision respecBng the liberty of the press. These and several others which have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the exisBng consBtuBon of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the laaer for imperfecBons which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a beaer proof of the insincerity and affectaBon of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the convenBon among us, who profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which they live, than the fury with which they have aaacked that plan, for maaers in regard to which our own consBtuBon is equally or perhaps more vulnerable. The addiBonal securiBes to republican government, to liberty and to property, to be derived from the adopBon of the plan under consideraBon, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservaBon of the Union will impose on local facBons and insurrecBons, and on the ambiBon of powerful individuals in single States, who may  42 acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminuBon of the opportuniBes to foreign intrigue, which the dissoluBon of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevenBon of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situaBon; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of Btles of nobility; and in the precauBons against the repeBBon of those pracBces on the part of the State governments which have undermined the foundaBons of property and credit, have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of ciBzens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostraBon of morals. Thus have I, fellow-ciBzens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecBng the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperiBes which are too apt to disgrace poliBcal disputants of all parBes, and which have been not a liale provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the ConsBtuBon. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberBes of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignaBon of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutaBon of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentaBons which have been in various ways pracBced to keep the truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobaBon of all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderaBon; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither oqen nor much. Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed ConsBtuBon has not been saBsfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbaBon, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer these quesBons to himself, according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and to  43 act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a dispensaBon. 'This is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by all the obligaBons that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly. No parBal moBve, no parBcular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or prejudice, will jusBfy to himself, to his country, or to his posterity, an improper elecBon of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an obsBnate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon which he is to decide is not a parBcular interest of the community, but the very existence of the naBon; and let him remember that a majority of America has already given its sancBon to the plan which he is to approve or reject. I shall not dissemble that I feel an enBre confidence in the arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adopBon, and that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our poliBcal situaBon, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior to any the revoluBon has produced. Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim to absolute perfecBon, have afforded maaer of no small triumph to its enemies. “Why,” say they, “should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?” This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been stated as amounBng to an admission that the plan is radically defecBve, and that without material alteraBons the rights and the interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an enBre perversion of their sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his senBment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as promises every species of security which a reasonable people can desire. I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our naBonal affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the deliberaBons of all collecBve bodies must necessarily be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the  44 good sense and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to embrace thirteen disBnct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinaBons. How can perfecBon spring from such materials? The reasons assigned in an excellent liale pamphlet lately published in this city,1are unanswerable to show the uaer improbability of assembling a new convenBon, under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late convenBon met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the producBon itself has had an extensive circulaBon. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments sBll remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this aspect. It appears to me suscepBble of absolute demonstraBon, that it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the ConsBtuBon. The moment an alteraBon is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adopBon, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the ConsBtuBon proposed should once be raBfied by all the States as it stands, alteraBons in it may at any Bme be effected by nine2 States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adopBon of an enBre system. This is not all. Every ConsBtuBon for the United States must inevitably consist of a great variety of parBculars, in which thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formaBon, very different combinaBons of the parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on one quesBon, may become the minority on a second, and an associaBon dissimilar to either may consBtute the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the parBculars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner as to saBsfy all the parBes to the compact; and hence, also, an immense mulBplicaBon of difficulBes and casualBes in obtaining the collecBve assent to a final act. The degree of that mulBplicaBon must evidently be in a raBo to the number of parBculars and the number of parBes.  45 But every amendment to the ConsBtuBon, if once established, would be a single proposiBon, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relaBon to any other point, no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the maaer to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a parBcular amendment, that amendment must infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecBng an amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete ConsBtuBon. In opposiBon to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged that the persons delegated to the administraBon of the naBonal government will always be disinclined to yield up any porBon of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough convicBon that any amendments which may, upon mature consideraBon, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organizaBon of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observaBon just stated. I also think there is liale weight in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculaBons upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the naBonal rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodaBon to the reasonable expectaBons of their consBtuents. But there is yet a further consideraBon, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observaBon is fuBle. It is this that the naBonal rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no opBon upon the subject. By the fiqh arBcle of the plan, the Congress will be obliged “on the applicaBon of the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount to nine), to call a convenBon for proposing amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the ConsBtuBon, when raBfied by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by convenBons in three fourths thereof.” The words of this arBcle are peremptory. The Congress “shall call a convenBon.” Nothing in this parBcular is leq to the discreBon of that body. And of consequence, all the declamaBon about the disinclinaBon to a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relaBve to the general liberty or  46 security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposiBon of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the naBonal authority. If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself deceived by it, for it is, in my concepBon, one of those rare instances in which a poliBcal truth can be brought to the test of a mathemaBcal demonstraBon. Those who see the maaer in the same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adopBon, as the most direct road to their own object. The zeal for aaempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the ConsBtuBon, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observaBons of a writer equally solid and ingenious: “To balance a large state or society Usays hee, whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflecBon, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide their labor; Bme must bring it to perfecBon, and the feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall into in their first trials and experiments."3 These judicious reflecBons contain a lesson of moderaBon to all the sincere lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienaBon of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despoBsm of a victorious demagoguery, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but from Bme and experience. It may be in me a defect of poliBcal forBtude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer conBnuance in our present situaBon as imaginary. A naBon, without a naBonal government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment of a ConsBtuBon, in Bme of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the compleBon of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and aqer having passed over so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new aaempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general naBonal government in every possible shape. PUBLIUS. 6. EnBtled ”An Address to the People of the State of New York.“ Back to text  47 7. It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must raBfy. Back to text \\ 8. Hume's ”Essays,“ vol. i., page 128: ”The Rise of Arts and Sciences.“ Back to text |
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