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====== The Baton Rouge Lawyer ======


Attachment: 3425/Article_V_Revisited_BR_Lawyer.pdf
| \\ \\ \\ \\ {{:public:cb_mirror:files_19044_pdfto001.png?nolink&918x1188|}}\\ \\ 18    \\ \\ The Baton Rouge Lawyer\\ \\ Article V Revisited: The U.S.  \\ \\ Constitutional Provision for States \\ \\ to Control the Federal Government \\ \\ and Louisiana Participation \\ \\ //By Albert Dale Clary//\\ \\ T\\ \\ he U.S. Constitution \\ \\ has a little-known \\ \\ provision for the states \\ \\ to control a runaway \\ \\ federal government: Article V, \\ \\ the amendments article. Article \\ \\ V has two methods for amending \\ \\ the Constitution, but only one has been \\ \\ used. All 27 of the current amendments \\ \\ to the Constitution were proposed by \\ \\ one method, in which Congress intro-\\ \\ duced amendments and states ratified \\ \\ those proposals. However, Article V \\ \\ has a second method for introducing \\ \\ amendments, known as the convention \\ \\ method.\\ \\ 1\\ \\  The text, logic and history \\ \\ of Article V show this second method \\ \\ was created to give states the power to \\ \\ control the federal government when the \\ \\ federal government fails to honor the \\ \\ Constitution’s limits on federal power.\\ \\ **Article V: The text **\\ \\ Article V provides a process for the \\ \\ states to propose amendments, rather \\ \\ than Congress:\\ \\ The Congress, whenever two thirds \\ \\ of both Houses shall deem it neces-\\ \\ sary, shall propose Amendments \\ \\ to this Constitution, //or, on the Ap-//\\ \\ //plication of the Legislatures of two //\\ \\ //thirds of the several States, shall //\\ \\ //call a Convention for proposing //\\ \\ //Amendments//, which, in either \\ \\ Case, //shall be valid// to all Intents \\ \\ and Purposes, //as Part of this //\\ \\ //Constitution, when ratified by //\\ \\ //the Legislatures of three fourths of the //\\ \\ //several States//, or by Conventions in \\ \\ three fourths thereof, as the one or \\ \\ the other Mode of Ratification may \\ \\ be proposed by the Congress . . . .\\ \\ 2\\ \\ So, when two-thirds of the states \\ \\ apply for a convention for proposing \\ \\ amendments, Congress “shall” call \\ \\ that convention. However, any amend-\\ \\ ments proposed by the convention \\ \\ only become “part” of the Constitution \\ \\ if ratified by the legislatures of three-\\ \\ fourths of the states, just as any amend-\\ \\ ments proposed by Congress. \\ \\ **How the state power to control the **\\ \\ **federal government arose**\\ \\ As the Constitutional Convention \\ \\ neared its completion in 1787, the only \\ \\ method to propose amendments was \\ \\ for Congress to propose them. Then, on \\ \\ Sept. 15, 1787, George Mason of Virginia \\ \\ addressed the Convention and said, as \\ \\ paraphrased by James Madison in his \\ \\ notes of the Convention, “It would be \\ \\ improper to require the consent of the \\ \\ Natl. Legislature because they may abuse \\ \\ their power, and refuse their consent on \\ \\ that very account. . . .”\\ \\ 3\\ \\  \\ \\ Thus, Article V was modified to provide \\ \\ for states to control one mode of \\ \\ proposing amendments.\\ \\ 4\\ \\  Both modes \\ \\ of proposing amendments were subject \\ \\ to the same state ratification to become \\ \\ part of the Constitution. However, this \\ \\ second method puts states in control \\ \\ of both proposing the amendments \\ \\ and ratifying the amendments. As one \\ \\ contemporary essayist said, \\ \\ The sovereign //power of amending //\\ \\ //the constitution //. . . does not lie with \\ \\ the federal legislature, whom some \\ \\ have erroneously apprehended to \\ \\ be supreme. That power, which is \\ \\ truly and evidently the real point of \\ \\ sovereignty,  //is vested in the several //\\ \\ //legislatures// and [ratifying] conven-\\ \\ tions of the states, chosen by people \\ \\ respectively with them.\\ \\ 5\\ \\   \\ \\ Alexander Hamilton in 1788 observed \\ \\ this about Article V:\\ \\ //[T]he national rulers//, whenever nine \\ \\ states concur, //will have no option upon //\\ \\ //the subject//. By the fifth article of the \\ \\ plan //the congress will be obliged//,  . . .//The //\\ \\ //words of this article are peremptory//. \\ \\ The Congress “//shall call a conven-//\\ \\ //tion//.” Nothing in this particular is \\ \\ left to the discretion of that body.\\ \\ 6\\ \\ The use of this second method of \\ \\ proposing amendments gives the states \\ \\ power over both proposing and ratifying \\ \\ \\ \\ {{:public:cb_mirror:files_19044_pdfto002.png?nolink&918x1188|}}\\ \\ July/August 2022\\ \\     19\\ \\ amendments. The role of Congress in \\ \\ this process is very limited, //i.e.//, only to \\ \\ “call” the convention.\\ \\ 7\\ \\  As explained by \\ \\ Professor Natelson, this convention is a \\ \\ Convention of States, not Congress,\\ \\ 8\\ \\  and \\ \\ Article V was written by those familiar \\ \\ with a long tradition of multi-colony and \\ \\ multi-state conventions.\\ \\ 9\\ \\ **Current state efforts to amend the **\\ \\ **Constitution **\\ \\ State legislatures have approved \\ \\ numerous applications for amendment \\ \\ conventions. Various estimates range \\ \\ from dozens to over 400.\\ \\ 10\\ \\  In 2015, \\ \\ Congress began tracking these applica-\\ \\ tions, and a registry of “memorials” to \\ \\ propose amendments is kept by the Com-\\ \\ mittee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House \\ \\ of Representatives.\\ \\ 11\\ \\  Other websites also \\ \\ privately track state resolutions.\\ \\ 12\\ \\ While no resolution has yet reached \\ \\ the threshold 34 states required to \\ \\ force Congress to “call” an amendment \\ \\ convention, national interest in limiting \\ \\ the growth of the federal government has \\ \\ given birth to several Article V amendment \\ \\ movements. Currently, the most notable \\ \\ are the Balanced Budget Amendment \\ \\ Task Force\\ \\ 13\\ \\  and the Convention of States \\ \\ Project,\\ \\ 14\\ \\  but there are other efforts.\\ \\ 15\\ \\ **Louisiana Article V resolutions **\\ \\ Louisiana has been one of the most \\ \\ active states to approve such ap-\\ \\ plications.\\ \\ 16\\ \\  For example, in 1907 the \\ \\ Louisiana legislature passed a resolution \\ \\ calling for a convention to propose an \\ \\ amendment for direct election of U.S. \\ \\ Senators, noting that “[t]he failure of \\ \\ Congress to submit such amendments \\ \\ to the States has made it clear that the \\ \\ only practicable method of securing a \\ \\ submission to the States is through” an \\ \\ Article V convention.\\ \\ 17\\ \\  More recently, \\ \\ Louisiana has passed resolutions to \\ \\ question federal government control \\ \\ over public schools (1960),\\ \\ 18\\ \\  bar federal \\ \\ taxation of interest income on state debt \\ \\ (1970),\\ \\ 19\\ \\  allow school choice (1970),\\ \\ 20\\ \\  \\ \\ impose limits on the federal debt (1975)\\ \\ 21\\ \\  \\ \\ and require a balanced federal budget \\ \\ (1975).\\ \\ 22\\ \\  However, in 1990 the legislature \\ \\ rescinded all prior Article V resolutions.\\ \\ 23\\ \\ In 2016, the Louisiana legislature \\ \\ approved an application for a convention \\ \\ to propose amendments limited to three \\ \\ subject areas: to (1) limit the terms of \\ \\ office that may be served by its officials \\ \\ and by members of Congress, (2) \\ \\ impose fiscal restraints upon the federal \\ \\ government and (3) limit the power and \\ \\ jurisdiction of the federal government.\\ \\ 24\\ \\  \\ \\ In 2018, the legislature approved a \\ \\ Commissioner Selection resolution, \\ \\ discussed further below. Since then, two \\ \\ Article V resolutions for term limits have \\ \\ failed to pass.\\ \\ 25\\ \\  \\ \\ **Possible Amendments arising **\\ \\ **from the 2016 Louisiana Article V **\\ \\ **resolution **\\ \\ The three subject areas of the Louisiana \\ \\ 2016 resolution could include amend-\\ \\ ments that impose significant limits on \\ \\ federal power. Possible amendments \\ \\ germane to the call would be those \\ \\ to impose term limits on members \\ \\ of Congress and the judiciary and \\ \\ to require a balanced budget. Other \\ \\ possible amendments could be to repeal \\ \\ the direct election of U.S. Senators,\\ \\ 26\\ \\  \\ \\ grant the states direct authority to check \\ \\ Congress\\ \\ 27\\ \\  or check the authority of \\ \\ federal bureaucracies\\ \\ 28\\ \\  or to narrow the \\ \\ judicial expansion of the Commerce \\ \\ Clause or the General Welfare clause. \\ \\ **The Louisiana model legislation **\\ \\ **for state legislative control of the **\\ \\ **amendment convention **\\ \\ Although some authors critical of an \\ \\ Article V amendment convention raise \\ \\ the specter of a “runaway” convention,\\ \\ 29\\ \\  \\ \\ Louisiana is one of the states that has \\ \\ already passed a resolution to direct how \\ \\ the state legislature will control the people \\ \\ sent to the convention. In the 2018 Com-\\ \\ missioner Selection Resolution (CSR), \\ \\ the legislature directed how it will //select//, \\ \\ //authorize//,// instruct// and //supervise// the people \\ \\ who attend this convention.\\ \\ 30\\ \\  As Professor \\ \\ Natelson reports, “Founding-Era practice \\ \\ informs us also that commissioners at an \\ \\ amendment convention were to operate \\ \\ under agency law and remain within the \\ \\ limits of their commissions[,]”\\ \\ 31 \\ \\ which \\ \\ includes “//the duty to abide by instructions //\\ \\ //established by// concurrent resolution of //the //\\ \\ //legislature// for participation in the conven-\\ \\ tion and the duty //to act only within the scope //\\ \\ //of the Louisiana Legislature’s application for //\\ \\ //the convention// . . . .”\\ \\ 32\\ \\ This 2018 CSR imposes two layers \\ \\ of limitations on the authority of \\ \\ Louisiana’s commissioners. First, the \\ \\ commissioners cannot act outside the \\ \\ convention resolution by the Louisiana \\ \\ legislature. The “duty to act only within \\ \\ the scope of the . . . Legislature’s applica-\\ \\ tion” means Louisiana’s commissioners \\ \\ cannot participate in any “runaway” \\ \\ convention.\\ \\ 33\\ \\  Second, the commissioners’ \\ \\ \\ \\ {{:public:cb_mirror:files_19044_pdfto003.png?nolink&918x1188|}}\\ \\ 20    \\ \\ The Baton Rouge Lawyer\\ \\ authority to act will be limited by any \\ \\ “instructions established by concurrent \\ \\ resolution of the legislature.”\\ \\ 34\\ \\     \\ \\ To leave no doubt, the Louisiana CSR \\ \\ contains the clear statement that any vote \\ \\ cast by a commissioner outside the scope \\ \\ of the legislature’s instructions or the \\ \\ legislature’s application “is an unauthor-\\ \\ ized vote and is therefore vo//id.//”\\ \\ 35\\ \\  This \\ \\ Louisiana procedure is entirely consistent \\ \\ with similar historical conventions, for \\ \\ which typically the legislatures, sitting as \\ \\ representatives of the citizens, selected, \\ \\ “empowered,” instructed and supervised \\ \\ their amendment convention commis-\\ \\ sioners.\\ \\ 36\\ \\  This procedure for limiting \\ \\ authority of commissioners to an Article \\ \\ V convention is also entirely consistent \\ \\ with the Louisiana Civil Code articles \\ \\ on mandate, which allow a principal to \\ \\ impose limitations on the authority of \\ \\ its mandates.\\ \\ 37\\ \\  It is anticipated all states \\ \\ that send commissioners to the amend-\\ \\ ment convention would similarly select, \\ \\ authorize, instruct and supervise that \\ \\ state’s commissioners. \\ \\ **Conclusions **\\ \\ Louisiana has been a leader in the Article \\ \\ V movement. The legislature has passed \\ \\ perhaps more resolutions for Article V \\ \\ conventions than any other state and has \\ \\ also passed a CSR, which can serve as a \\ \\ model to other states on how to control \\ \\ the commissioners and conduct of any \\ \\ Article V convention.\\ \\ //1 //\\ \\ Michael Stern, //Reopening the Constitutional Road to //\\ \\ //Reform: Toward a Safeguarded Article V Convention//, \\ 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 765, 765 (2011).\\ \\ //2 //\\ \\ U.S. Const. art. V (emphasis added).\\ \\ //3 //\\ \\ Robert G. Natelson, //Proposing Constitutional //\\ \\ //Amendments by Convention: Rules Governing the \\ Process//, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 693, 732-33 n.21 (citing The \\ Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Max \\ Farrand ed., 1937)) and n.264-69.\\ \\ //4 //\\ \\ //See// Robert G. Natelson, //Founding Era Conventions //\\ \\ //and the Meaning of the Constitution’s Convention \\ for Proposing Amendments//, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 615, 621 \\ (2013).\\ \\ //5 //\\ \\ As stated by Trent Coxe, a Philadelphia business-\\ \\ man and one of the most influential pro-Constitu-\\ tion essayists, as described by Robert G. Natelson \\ in The Law of Article V, State of Initiation of \\ Constitutional Amendments 28  (2018) (emphasis \\ added).\\ \\ //6 //\\ \\ Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers No. 85 \\ \\ (1788) (emphasis added).\\ \\ //7 //\\ \\ Natelson, //supra// note 3, at 733 \\ \\ //8 //\\ \\ Robert G. Natelson, //Why The Constitution’s “Con-//\\ \\ //vention for Proposing Amendments” Is a Convention \\ of the States//, Policy Brief, The Heartland Institute, \\ October, 2017.  \\ \\ //9 //\\ \\ Natelson, //supra// note 4, at 620.\\ \\ //10 //\\ \\ The Article V Library, http:%%//%%article5library.org/\\ \\ applications.htm.\\ \\ //11 //\\ \\ U.S. House or Representatives Clerk, //Selected //\\ \\ //Memorials//, http:%%//%%clerk.house.gov/legislative/memo-\\ rials.aspx. \\ \\ //12 //\\ \\ //See//, //e.g.//, State Legislators Article V Caucus, http:%%//%%\\ \\ articlevcaucus.com/; Friends of the Article V Con-\\ vention http:%%//%%www.foavc.org/01page/Amendments/\\ index.htm.\\ \\ //13 //\\ \\ http:%%//%%bba4usa.org/.\\ \\ //14 //\\ \\ Convention of the States Action, https:%%//%%conven-\\ \\ tionofstates.com/ (note that the author is a volun-\\ teer for the Convention of States Project). \\ \\ //15 //\\ \\ //See//, //e.g.//,U.S. Term Limits, https:%%//%%www.termlimits.\\ \\ com/; Wolf-PAC, https:%%//%%wolf-pac.com/.\\ \\ //16 //\\ \\ //See// U.S. House Clerk, //supra// note 11. \\ \\ //17 //\\ \\ National Archives, Center for Legislative Ar-\\ \\ chives, //Application of the Louisiana State Legislature //\\ \\ //**The Baton Rouge Lawyer**//**  **\\ \\ **is seeking  **\\ \\ **articles for publication. **\\ \\ Contact Pam Labbe  \\ \\ at pam@brba.org\\ \\ **Interested in serving **\\ \\ ** in a leadership position  **\\ \\ **in the BRBA? **\\ \\ Self-nomination forms for 2023 \\ \\ leaders will be in the next issue of  \\ \\ //The Baton Rouge Lawyer//\\ \\ .\\ \\ //and Governor for a Convention to Propose a Consti-\\ tutional Amendment for Direct Election of Senators, \\ November 25, 1907//, https:%%//%%www.archives.gov/legis-\\ lative/features/17th-amendment/louisiana.html.\\ \\ //18 //\\ \\ House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) No. 21 (Act \\ \\ 2 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1960).\\ \\ //19 //\\ \\ Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) No. 25 \\ \\ (Regular Session, 1970).\\ \\ //20 //\\ \\ HCR No. 12 (Reg. Session, 1970).\\ \\ //21 //\\ \\ SCR No. 109 (Reg. Session, 1975). \\ \\ //22 //\\ \\ HCR No. 269 (Reg. Session, 1975).\\ \\ //23 //\\ \\ HCR No. 218 (Reg. Session, 1990).\\ \\ //24 //\\ \\ SCR No. 52 (Reg. Session, 2016) (following the \\ \\ Convention of States resolution).  \\ \\ //25 //\\ \\ HCR No. 28 (Reg. Session, 2020); HCR No. 51 \\ \\ (Reg. Session, 2021). \\ \\ //26 //\\ \\ The 17th amendment changed the method of \\ \\ selection of U.S. Senators. \\ \\ //27 //\\ \\ Mark R. Levin, The Liberty Amendments 179 \\ \\ (2013). \\ \\ //28 //\\ \\ //Id.// at 99. \\ \\ //29 //\\ \\ //See//, //e.g.//, //The Article V Convention to Propose //\\ \\ //Constitutional Amendments: Current Developments//, \\ Congressional Research Service, November 15, \\ 2017, CRS report R44435, p. 18.\\ \\ //30 //\\ \\ HCR No. 4 (Reg. Session, 2018).\\ \\ //31 //\\ \\ Natelson, //supra// note 4, at 686.\\ \\ //32 //\\ \\ HCR No. 4, //supra// note 30, at Section 3.A (empha-\\ \\ sis added). \\ \\ //33 //\\ \\ For an excellent analysis of the mistaken no-\\ \\ tion that an amendments convention can be a \\ “runaway” convention to act on matters outside \\ the authority of commissioners, //see// Michael B. \\ Rappaport, //The Constitutionality of a Limited Con-\\ vention: An Originalist Analysis//, 81 Const. Comm. \\ 53 (April 6, 2012), available at https:%%//%%ssrn.com/\\ abstract=2035638.\\ \\ //34 //\\ \\ HCR No. 4, //supra// note 30, at Section 3.A. \\ \\ //35 //\\ \\ //Id.// at Section 3.C.\\ \\ //36 //\\ \\ Robert G. Natelson, The Law of Article V: State \\ \\ Initiation of Constitutional Amendments,  at § \\ 3.10. Selecting Commissioners, § 3.11. Empowering \\ Commissioners and § 3.12. Instructing and Super-\\ vising Commissioners.\\ \\ //37 //\\ \\ //See// La. C.C. art. 2989, //et.seq.//|


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|Created:                 |2023-02-08 18:52 GMT|
|Updated:                 |2024-11-27 00:00 GMT|
|Published:               |2023-02-08 00:00 GMT|
|Converted:               |2025-11-11 12:26 GMT|
|Change Author:           |Van Walter          |
|Credit Author:           |                    |